

REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT (2) Date 24 August 1944 (3) Time 1530 (1) Place Friston Air Field (5) A.F. No. 42-95#201 (6) Station AAF Station 166 (1) Organization: (7) IX B.C. Ninth AF (8) 391st Bomb Gp(9) (1) 573rd Bomb Sqdn (Squadron) (Squa	R DEPARTMENT A.F. Norm No. 14 evised Stay 15, 1942)		WAR	DEPARTME STATISTICS ST	NT	45	ACCIDENT N	24-5	541
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	55) Pilot's mission Taking .crews	to.F	riston to	oring ba	AL DIE	mag Dal	MIRKIE VO.		. Y.S. G. L
(56) Nature of accident Ran off end of runway into pit.	Pan off	and o	of runway	into pit.					
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		aline	nerv condi	tion of t	he runway		-	-	
(57) Cause of accident Muddy and slippery condition of the runway	57) Cause of socident Muddy and	OFFER	BRUNESH COLUMN				***************************************	*********	
(57) Cause of accident Muddy and slippery condition of the runway (58) Has form 54 been submitted: No	57) Cause of accident . Muddy and 58) Has form 54 been submi	itted:	No				چ	2	

RESTRICTED

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

(Brief narrative of accident. Include statement of responsibility and recommendations for action to prevent repetition)

1: On 24 August 1944, at about \$65\$, Lieutenant Frederick E. Barker filed a clearance for a ferry trip to Friston Air Field. Previously, flying control at AAF Station 166 had called flying control at Friston and they reported the field in good condition and cleared us for a B-26 landing there.

On arriving at Friston the pilot contacted flying control and was cleared for an immediate landing. Even though there was intermittent precipitation in the area; it was impossible for the pilot to ascertain the condition of the field from the air, and the slippery, soggy field was not reported to the pilot by flying control

A good landing was reported by the crew, however, there was not enough traction on the grass field to stop the B-26 at the end of the runway.

- 2. In the opinion of the committee the cause for the accident would be considered entirely on the judgement of flying control.
- 3. There are no recommendations.

Signature Donald K. Brandon, Lt Col., AC (Investigating Officer)

Ernest N. Ljunggren, Lt Col., AC James A. Sullans
James A. Sullans, Major, A.C.

Date 29 August 1944

Hq 505 5-43/10M/9093

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572ND BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON

APO 140, U. S. ARMY, 26 AUGUST 1944.

SUBJECT: AIRPLANE ACCIDENT 24 AUGUST 1944 - AIRPLANE # 41-95801.

CO-PILOT'S STATEMENT.

TO : OPERATIONS OFFICER, 391ST BOMBARDMENT GROUP, APO 140,

1. ON 21 AUGUST 1911 AT ABOUT 1615, WE WERE CIRCLING FRISTON AIR FIELD. 1, AS CO-PILOT, CONTACTED THE TOWER FOR LANDING INSTRUCTIONS AND RECEIVED THEM. WE WERE TO TOUCH DOWN ON THE VERY END OF THE FIELD ON A SHORT STRIP OF STEEL MATTING. WE MADE A NORMAL APPROACH WO A LANDING AND THE PILOT, LT BARKER, DECIDED THAT WE WOULD OVERSHOOT: SO WE WENT AROUND A GAIN AND MADE ANOTHER NORMAL APPROACH WITH WHEELS DOWN AND FLAPS DOWN AT APPROXIMATELY 140 M.P.B. TO THE RUNWAY. WE TOUCHED THE RUNWAY FIRST ON THE STEEL MATTING AND RCLLED UNTIL WE HIT THE FIRST HILL ON THE RUNWAY WHERE WE BOUNCED INTO THE AIR AGAIN. WE SETTLED BACK DOWN AND EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL AND UNDER CONTROL. THE PILOT HELD THE NOSE WHEEL OFF THE GROUND TO LOSE SPEED, BUT NOT FOR LONG AS THE RUNWAY IS NOT TOO LONG. WHEN THE PILOT PUT THE NOSE ON THE BRAKES, THEY DID NOT RESPOND TO THE PRESSURE. AT THIS TIME, WE WERE ABOUT THREE FOURTHS OF THE WAY DOWN THE RUNWAY AND STILL TRAVELING APPROXIMATELY 100 M.P.H. THE PILOT TRIED TO APPLY THE BRAKES AGAIN AND FOUND THEM TO BE NO GOOD. HE THEN TRIED TO GROUND LOOP THE AIRPLANE, BUT COULD NOT. WE SAW THAT A CRASH WAS COMING AND RELAYED THAT INFORMATION TO THE CREW. I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO PULL UP THE WHEELS, BUT I CUT OFF THE MIXTURE CONTROL AND MASTER AND IGNITION SWITCHES BEFORE WE HIT THE DIRT EMBANKMENT AT THE END OF THE RUNWAY. AS WE HIT THE ENBANKMENT, THE NOSE AND MAIN WHEELS WERE SHEARED OFF AND WE WENT OVER IT AND INTO A GRAVEL PIT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ENBANKMENT, WHICH PIT IS ABOUT 30 TO 40 FEET DEEP AND 55 FEET WIDE. THE LAST I CAN REMEMBER CLEARLY IS THE PLANE CRASHING INTO THE PIT WHILE I WAS HOLDING THE WHEEL IN THE FORWARD POSITION WITH ONE HAND AND OPENING THE HATCH WITH THE OTHER.

2. AFTER THE CRASH, I CAN REMEMBER BEING HELPED OUT OF THE PLANE BY LT NETHERTON WHO WAS RIDING IN THE RADIO COMPARTMENT AND REMEMBER SEEING SGT SCHAEFER AND PUTERKA TRYING TO GET TO THE PILOT AND GET HIM OUT OF THE AIRPLANE. THE RIGHT ENGINE WAS ON FIRE BUT NOT BURNING TOO BADLY AT THAT TIME. AFTER THE ABOVE SGTS SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE PILOT OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT, SGT PUTERKA WENT BACK AND STARTED THROWING DIRT UPON THE BURNING ENGINE, AND SGT SCHAEFER CONTINUED TO HELP LT BARKER UP THE HILL AND TO THE AMBULANCE. EVERYONE WAS GIVEN IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ATTENTION OF THE HIGHEST KIND.

3. THE WEATHER AT THE TIME WE ARRIVED AT FRISTON WAS A MODERATE RAIN, WITH VISABILITY AT APPROXIMATELY 1 TO 2 MILES: IT WOULD CLEAR UP IN PLACES AND VISIBILITY WOULD INCREASE TO 3 MILES. ON THE FIELD ITSELF IT WAS RAINING AND THE BROUND WAS SOGGY AND SLICK. THE TOWER CLEARED US TO LAND AT THEIR FIELD AND DID NOT REPORT THE SLIPPER BUNWAY.

2ND LT, AC.

RESTRICTED

572ND BONDARDNENT SQUADRON

APO 140, U. S. Army, 26 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Airplane Accident 24 August 1944 - Mirplane # 41-95801.
Passenger's Statement.

TO : Operations Officer, 391st Bombardment Group, APO 140, U. S. Army.

1. I was a passenger riding in the turret of plane #801 when the accident took place at about 1615.

2. The runway was wet. Landing on the steel mat, a bump threw the plane into the air again. When the plane came down to land after hitting the bump, it was past the steel mat and on the wet grass which had a clay base. The brakes was past the steel mat and on the wet grass which had a clay base. The brakes did not seem to be slowing the speed of the plane and the tires were skidding across the ground. The co-pilot pulled the air bottle. The right wheel had across the ground. The co-pilot pulled the right side in the direction of more traction and pulled the plane toward the right side in the wheels and to an embankment. It appeared that it was too late to pull up the wheels and to an embankment a base of a skid landing. The co-pilot opened the bombay skid on the plane's bally for a skid landing. The co-pilot opened the bombay skid on the plane's bally for a skid landing. The embankment about 100 M.P.H., doors for them to catch on the ground. We hit the embankment about 100 M.P.H., which broke off the landing gear and bomb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing gear and bomb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing gear and bomb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing gear and bomb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing gear and bomb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing gear and bomb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing gear and bomb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing gear and bomb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing gear and bomb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing for help domb bay doors, and slowed the speed of which broke off the landing for help for the plane. The plane is the plane in the plane in the plane in the plane is the plane in the pla

EARL A. SCHAEFFER, 32280968 S/Sgt, 572nd Bomb Sq.

Engineer-Gunner.

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Subject: Report of Aircraft Accident (B-26-45, A.F. No. 42-95-801).

1st W/Ind.
1st W/In TO: Commending Officer, A-73, APO 140, U. S. Army. 1. AAF Form 14 and attachments returned for the following: a. Considering evidence as submitted it is requested further investigation be made, as report leaves the conclusion that there is definitely a factor of pilot error or poor judgment involved in the accident, particularly, as regards this type of field and weather conditions at the time landing was made. It is desired that a definite conclusion be made as to whether pilot made his landing short enough, especially, as regards length of field, landing speed of this type aircraft and condition of field at the time accident occurred. 2. The above to be accomplished and corrected report will be re-submitted to this headquarters with the least possible delay. By command of Major General ANDERSON: U.S.A., Brig. Gen., Chief of Staff. 3 Incls: n/c G-GB-1 2nd W/Ind. HEADQUARTERS, AAF STATION 4-73, APO 140, U S Army, 18 October 1944. TO: Commanding Officer, 391st Bomb Group, AAF Station 4-73, U S Army. Attention directed to lat W/Ind for immediate corrective action. By order of Colonel WILLIAMS: buren lat Lt., Air Corps, 3 Incls: m/c

And: 4

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Subject: Report of Aircraft Accident (B-26B45, A. F. No. 42-95801).

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B-BLS-P

HEADQUARTERS, 391st Bombardment Group, APO 140, U. S. Army, 20 October 1944.

TO: Commanding Officer, AAF Station A-73, APO 140, U. S. Army.

l. A complete investigation of this accident has been made. In reference to 1st Lt Barker's landing this board concludes from the statements of the co-pilot and engineer gunner that the landing was short enough as regards the length of field and landing speed of this type aircraft. The statements agree that the pilot landed on the short steel matting which is the normal touchdown point for the runway. The co-pilot states that the approach airspeed was 140 MPH, which is not considered excessive, considering the load Lt Barker had in his aircraft. Further, the pilot knew that Friston was not an unusual airdrome for this type aircraft and although he did not know the exact condition of the field, it is felt by the board that he was following the correct procedure in taking the advice of the flying control at Friston, since they were familiar with this type aircraft.

For the Commanding Officer:

Donald K. Brandon

DONALD K. BRANDON, Lt Col, Air Corps, Investigating Officer.

Incl: 4

Subject: Report of Aircraft Accident (B-26B45, A. F. No. 42-95801). G-GB-2 HEADQUARTERS, AAF STATION A-73, APO 140, U. S. Army, 23 October 1944. TO: Commanding General, 9th Bombardment Division, APO 140, U S Army. Returned with completed investigation as directed in 1st W/Ind. Report of investigation is contained in 3rd W/Ind. GIENN E. BOWEN, 1st Lt, Air Corps, Adjutant.

Incl: 4

HEADQUANTERS OTH BOMBAFONENT DIVISION (N) E-Cal

360.33

APO 140, U. S. Army 9 Nevember 1944

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident Report.

TO : Germanding General, Army Air Forces.

- 1. Reference is made to aircraft socident occurring 1530 hours, 24 August 1944, Priston, England, pilot, Frederick E. Barker, 0-738331, let Lt., A.C., 9th Bombardment Division (H), AAF Station 166, aircraft B-26845 42-95001.
- 2. Apparently the only basis upon which the responsibility for the secident was placed "entirely on the judgement of flying control" was the fact that Flying Control at Friston, where the accident occurred, did not warn the pilet of the slippery condition of the field. However, regardless of the fact that Flying Control did not warn the pilet of the slippery condition of the field, the pilet should have been aware of the fact that a grass field with a steel matting runsay will inevitably be slippery when wet. The statement of the co-pilet, that upon arrival there was moderate rain on the field, should have procluded the necessity for such a warning to the pilet and should have been sufficient warning in itself that such a slippery condition could reasonably be expected. In view of this fact it is not believed that the placing of responsibility for the accident upon Flying Control, at Friston, can be justified.
- gumer, seem to indicate further factors of faulty pilot technique or error in judgment as the underlying cause of the secident. Although the field itself is not large and the runway is not too long (1750 yards), under normal conditions no great difficulty has been experienced in the past in landing B-26 aircraft on this field. The copilot's statement that although the approach speed was 140 m.p.h., which is normal for this aircraft under the load conditions at the time of the secident, the aircraft bounced into the sir upon coming to a rise in the runway, which indicates that the aircraft was actually travelling much too fast when it contacted the runway particularly since this rise was encountered after the aircraft had been relling on the ground for some distance. The co-pilot also stated that when they were three-currers distance from the runway, they were still going approximately 100 miles an hour, which also indicates an abnormally fast landing speed. While the engineer-gumer stated that he believed they hit the embandment at about 100 m.p.h., this cannot be accepted as fact since he was not riding where he could see the airspeed indicator, however, it does provide another indication that the aircraft touched down at an excessive speed.
- A. Considering the statements of the co-pilot, the engineer-gamer, the narrative of the socident in the Aircraft Accident Cormittee's report and the physical condition and size of the field it is the opinion of this headquarters that the basic cause of the secient was a combination of adverse weather conditions and

Jul 5

(Aircraft Accident Report, 7 Nov &4, cont'd.) faulty silet technique. For the Commanding General: RICHARD C. SANDERS, Brig. Con., U.S.A., Chief of Steff.

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RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS AAF STATION #166

APO 140, US Army. 31 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Report of Aircraft Accident.

TO : Commanding Coneral, DK Bomber Command, APO 140, U S Army.

Transmitted herewith WD AAF Form No. 14. Report of Aircraft Accident, 340,37 (in quadruplicate) of aircraft B-26H45, A.F. No. 42-95-801.

For the Commanding Officer:

RECEIVEL 31 AUG 1944 HQ. X BOMBER

GLENN E. BOWEN. lst Lt, Air Corps, Ad jutant.

3 Incls:

Incl #1 - WD AAF Form No. 14 (in quadrapticate).

Incl #2 - Statement of 2nd It John J. Reynolds (co-pilet).

Del #3 - Statement of 2/6st Earl A. Schooler (engineer-gunner).

360.33 E-J-4 1st Ind. HEADQUARTERS 9TH BOMBARDMENT DIVISION (M), APO 140, U. S. ARMY, 9 November 1944.

TO: Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, APO 696, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted in compliance with Memorandum 55-1, Headquarters Ninth Air Force, dated 22 March 1944.

2. This headquarters does not agree with the Aircraft Accident Committee in assessment of responsibility and is submitting separate letter to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, copies attached hereto.

For the Commanding General:


Chief of Staff.

HOY 1944


5 Incls:

Incls 1 - 3 - n/c
Incl 4 - 1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th W/Inds
Incl 5 - 9th B.D. letter "Aircraft Accident Report".

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9TH BOMBARDMENT DIVISION (M)

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SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident Report.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

APO 140, U. S. Army 9 November 1944

1. Reference is made to aircraft accident occurring 1530 hours, 24 August 1944, Friston, England, pilot, Frederick E. Barker, 0-738331, 1st Lt., A.C., 9th Bombardment Division (M), AAF Station 166, aircraft B-26845 - 42-95801.

- 2. Apparently the only basis upon which the responsibility for the accident was placed "entirely on the judgement of flying control" was the fact that Flying Control at Friston, where the accident occurred, did not warn the pilot of the slippery condition of the field. However, regardless of the fact that Flying Control did not warn the pilot of the slippery condition of the field, the pilot should have been aware of the fact that a grass field with a steel matting runway will inevitably be slippery when wet. The statement of the co-pilot, that upon arrival there was moderate rain on the field itself, should have precluded the necessity for such a warning to the pilot and should have been sufficient warning in itself that such a slippery condition could reasonably be expected. In view of this fact it is not believed that the placing of responsibility for the accident upon Flying Control, at Friston, can be justified.
- 3. In addition to the above, the statement of the co-pilot and the Engineer-gunner, seem to indicate further factors of faulty pilot technique or error in judgement as the underlying cause of the accident. Although the field itself is not large and the runway is not too long (1750 yards), under normal conditions no great difficulty has been experienced in the past in landing B-26 aircraft on this field. The copilot's statement that although the approach speed was 140 m.p.h., which is normal for this aircraft under the load conditions at the time of the accident, the aircraft bounced into the air upon coming to a rise in the runway, which indicates that the aircraft was actually travelling much too fast when it contacted the runway particularly since this rise was encountered after the aircraft had been rolling on the ground for some distance. The co-pilot also stated that when they were three-quarters distance down the runway, they were still going approximately 100 miles an hour, which also indicates an abnormally fast landing speed. While the engineer-hour, which also indicates an abnormally fast landing speed. While the engineer-gunner stated that he believed they hit the embankment at about 100 m.p.h., this cannot be accepted as fact since he was not riding where he could see the airspeed indicator, however, it does provide another indication that the sircraft touched down at an excessive speed.
- 4. Considering the statements of the co-pilot, the engineer-gunner, the narrative of the accident in the Aircraft Accident Committee's report and the physical condition and size of the field it is the opinion of this headquarters that the basic cause of the accident was a combination of adverse weather conditions and

(Aircraft Accident Report, 7 Nov 44, cont'd.)

faulty pilot technique.

For the Commanding General:

RICHARD C. SANDERS, Brig. Gen., U.S.A., Chief of Staff.